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 Abstract 
Biosecurity, biocontainment and security practices are important in production 
animal agriculture.  Procuring cattle from multiple sources and commingling them into a 
single confinement operation increases risk of disease introduction.  The large 
concentration of animals makes a feedyard a more likely target of a domestic or 
international terror group.  Controlling or eradicating an intentionally introduced 
pathogen or toxin would be costly. The aim of these surveys was to gather information 
from experts about perceived risks and mitigation strategies and to assess current 
practices of biosecurity, biocontainment and security in Central Plains feedyards.  
Consulting veterinarians and feedyard managers shared similar views on the likelihood of 
disease caused by terrorism, natural introduction or accidental introduction, and on the 
importance of on-site security.  They disagreed on the importance of preventative 
products, disease transmission control, and environmental control.  Generally speaking, 
feedyard managers believed environmental control to be more important than consulting 
veterinarians.  In reference to a survey of current practices, some feedyards use 
equipment for both manure and feed handling.  Many feedyards are not cleaning and 
disinfecting oral treatment equipment, treatment facilities, or unloading facilities on a 
regular basis which may increases their risk for indirect disease transmission of endemic 
agents such as Salmonella or BVDV.  Most feedyards in this survey import some cattle 
directly from an auction market, do not require clean boots or foot covering to be worn 
by visitors, and do not require trailers to be cleaned.  Smaller feedyards were more likely 
to require trailers to be cleaned before loading incoming cattle.  Less than half of the 
feedyards reported having a fence that will stop humans or kept protein supplements or 
micro-nutrients secured from access.  Some feedyards enforced a visitor log or employed 
a night watchman.  Most feedyards learned about a future employee by calling references 
listed in resume, but some performed a criminal background check.  A cost-benefit 
analysis should be done on all management practices to determine economic benefits.  
More research is needed to better understand which practices are most beneficial.
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 CHAPTER 1 - Review of Relevant Literature 
Overview of beef industry 
 
The beef industry is a prominent sector in United States agriculture.  Cash receipts 
from cattle and calves in 2006 was estimated at over 50.5 billion dollars.1  Total beef 
production in 2006 averaged over 505 million pounds each week.2  The cattle feeding 
portion of the industry was developed as an alternative revenue generator for farmers 
with cash crops.3  While farmer-feeders began feeding cattle to market harvested grain 
and continue to do so today, cattle feeding has become an independent industry sector 
apart from farming.  Feedyards have grown in size and procure most or all feed instead of 
raising it themselves.  Feedyards with a one-time capacity in excess of 1,000 head 
marketed 22.4 million fed cattle  in 2006 and had almost 12 million cattle on feed in the 
January 1, 2007 US inventory.4 Current commercial cattle feeders manage cattle all year 
round compared to the seasonal beef production that characterized the pioneers in the 
industry.  In 2006 farmer-feeders (less than 1,000 head) marketed 3.6 million cattle in 
86,000 feedyards across the United States, while 126 feedyards with more than 32,000 
head marketed over 11 million cattle.4   
As the industry began to grow from farmer-feeder to commercial beef production, 
the larger feedyards began to concentrate west of the Mississippi river where most the 
cow-calf population was historically located and which also is in close proximity to an 
ample supply of feed commodities.5  Meat packers and auction markets followed the 
industry to the developing beef belt that was forming from the Texas panhandle north 
into the panhandle of Oklahoma, western Kansas, eastern Colorado and Nebraska.  This 
geographical area is where the majority of US cattle are fed today. 
 
Risks faced by the feedyard industry 
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 Biosecurity is defined as management strategies for prevention of disease entry 
and are different for each animal production system.6  These strategies should be 
identified and implemented on the basis of a risk assessment of which diseases are most 
threatening and would create the biggest impact in the feedyard from a herd health or an 
economic standpoint.6  Understanding the disease agents and their routes of transmission 
is important in identifying mitigation strategies.  Biocontainment, that is strategies to 
control transmission of disease within an operation, should be emphasized with diseases 
that are endemic within a population of animals.  Biocontainment strategies within the 
feedyard are important because biosecurity efforts to prevent introduction of endemic 
diseases may be impractical in the high turnover environment of a modern feedyard and 
the current marketing channels in the U.S.  
There are many attributes unique to feedyards that make prevention of disease 
introduction challenging.  Feedyards typically feed cattle for a period of 90 to 150 days 
and the population turns over on average 2.5 times each year.  While the broiler and 
swine industries may have higher importation rates than feedyards, because of 
management requirements, the animals are not exposed to a constant influx of incoming 
animals as occurs in the feedyard.  Swine and poultry barns are designed to place a group 
of animals of similar age and size.  When the animals are harvested, the entire barn is 
emptied and thorough cleaning and disinfection of the facility is performed (all-in-all-
out).  New animals are never introduced to animals in a more advanced stage of 
production.  This helps break the cycle of disease and helps prevent disease transmission 
between animal groups.  Feedyards do not practice all-in-all-out management methods.  
Standard US feedyard facility design typically includes outdoor pens with dirt pen floors.  
Incoming cattle have the potential to introduce new diseases to animals in the resident 
herd and to be exposed to diseases already present within the feedyard population.  In 
contrast to the swine and poultry industries where total confinement is utilized, the cycle 
of disease cannot be interrupted as easily.   
Feedyard design not only presents challenges with biocontainment of disease, but 
it also becomes a security challenge.  The extensive perimeter of a typical feedyard 
provides numerous opportunities for unauthorized entry to the feedyard by individuals or 
groups with malicious intent.  While total confinement operations can be secured by 
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 locked doors, the outdoor environment of the typical feedyard is secured by using a 
perimeter fence and locked entrance gates to deter entry.  Intentional introduction by a 
terrorist group may be unlikely, but it is a concern because of the high concentration of 
animals, the relative ease of entry, and the potential for a large impact depending on the 
infectious agent or toxin used.  If the goal of the terror group was to deflate the economy 
of the beef industry and the US in general, millions of cattle could be infected by selected 
agents with a relatively small amount of knowledge, resources or time.7
Feedyards are particularly vulnerable to disease introduction because of the large 
number of cattle procured annually from multiple sources8 including the reliance upon 
auction markets to provide a year around supply of cattle and meet the demands of 
optimum throughput for profitable feeding.  Transport and commingling associated with 
auction markets may increase stress due to commingling and exposure to pathogenic 
agents in cattle.  Some disease agents like Salmonella spp.9 may be shed more in times of 
stress.  Knowles et al.10 described live auction markets as “a process which extends 
transport times and multiplies the number of occasion that animals are loaded, unloaded, 
driven, introduced to unfamiliar environments and mixed with unfamiliar animals.”  It 
would be ideal to purchase cattle in a way that might decrease the stress associated with 
commingling.  Some have suggested that video auctions should be used to decrease stress 
induced by commingling, relocation, and transport.  Video auction markets allow cattle to 
be marketed directly from the farm, eliminating the commingling with cattle from other 
sources, and eliminating transport from the farm to the auction market location.10  In 
addition to potential health advantages, prices paid by buyers are higher at video auctions 
than traditional auction markets in the United States.11,12
Transportation may be more than a source of stress to cattle, but also an 
environment that permits direct and indirect disease transmission.  Barham et al.9 showed 
that approximately 7% of trailers utilized for hauling feeder cattle were positive for E. 
coli O157:H7 and 74.5% were positive for Salmonella.  They suggested that trailers may 
be a critical control point for reducing exposure of animals to these agents.  Parker et al.13 
found FMDV in samples of feces taken from the floor of isolation boxes containing steers 
up to 10 days after parenteral inoculation.  Prior research has shown that while fecal 
shedding of virus may be low, virus is shed in higher concentrations from the nose and 
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 mouth.14  The virus concentration in the fecal samples was likely attributed to the total 
environmental load with higher concentrations of virus likely coming from saliva and 
nasal discharge.  Therefore, cleaning and disinfection is warranted to prevent spread of 
disease agent from one load to the next, but may not be economically feasible for the 
trucking company because of the additional expense of time and labor.  If FMDV is 
introduced to the United States, it will likely be useful in limiting transmission after 
transport restrictions are lifted. 
Dee et al.15 supported the theory that trailers are a source of infection in a study of 
experimental transmission of porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus 
(PRRSV) to pigs by contact with an infected trailer model.  Limitations of the study 
included using a scaled model of a trailer with only one sentinel pig per treatment and 
artificial inoculation of the model trailers.  A high concentration of PRRSV was used to 
contaminate the trailer, and the inside of the trailer was washed with a power washer.  
Sentinel pigs were placed in the trailer and left for 2 hours resulting in infection of 2 of 4 
pigs.   The high level of contamination in the trailer may not be representative of typical 
field contamination, however in field conditions many animals are transported and 
exposed for longer periods of time.  While this study was not designed to answer 
questions about the transmission of bovine pathogens, it suggests trailers can serve as 
fomites in disease transmission.   
In a separate study, Dee et al.16 found that drying the trailers after cleaning and 
disinfection further reduced the infectivity of PRRSV from infected trailers compared to 
cleaning and disinfection alone.  While this study cannot be directly extrapolated to other 
pathogens in swine or in cattle, it may be an indication of the value of appropriate 
cleaning and disinfection methods in the beef industry.  More research is needed in this 
area to determine the efficacy and economic value of cleaning and disinfection of trailers 
in the reduction or elimination of bovine viral and bacterial pathogens. 
Before cattle are considered for purchase, feedyard managers may want to weigh 
cattle rearing procedures performed prior to auction as another method to decrease 
prevalence of some diseases.  Bach et al.17 showed that a long transport to the feedyard in 
the absence of preconditioning increased fecal shedding of E. coli O157:H7 and E. coli in 
feeder calves on arrival at the feedyard.  While findings were suggestive that short 
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 transport and preconditioning may decrease shedding, the authors recognized the need for 
future research to determine the possible and likely sources of E. coli O157:H7 infection 
for feedyard cattle to further characterize effective intervention strategies.  While E. coli 
O157 is not a pathogen of cattle these results suggest that management practices may 
impact shedding and environmental contamination from other pathogens as well.   
Barham et al.9 showed that Salmonella spp. prevalence increased from 6% to 87% 
in hides and from 18% to 43% in feces when comparing prevalences at the feedyard and 
the slaughter facility, respectively.  Transport time in this study was 30-40 minutes.  This 
suggests the stress of transport may increase shedding for some agents even following a 
short duration of transport.    
Biosecurity and biocontainment strategies are aimed at preventing disease agent 
introduction from a herd and controlling the agents already present within a herd.18  
Disease is dependent on the number and virulence of agents an animal is exposed to as 
well as the immune status of the animal.19  Immunity is influenced by many factors 
including stress, vaccines, and previous disease exposure.  The strategies included in a 
biosecurity plan focus on reducing the number of pathogens introduced to the facility 
from outside sources, including cattle, and in elevating the immunity of cattle within the 
feedyard when possible.  When biosecurity fails, it is important to have measures in place 
to prevent transmission of the agents introduced to the feedyard.20  Outlining 
biocontainment procedures is most important in preventing the transmission of endemic 
disease pathogens already present within the operation.   
All animal production systems face disease biosecurity and biocontainment 
challenges, but some of these practices are unique to the feedyard industry and need to be 
identified and addressed to decrease risks of disease introduction to cattle.  
 
Current Practices in the Feedyard industry 
 
Currently very little data is available on biocontainment, biosecurity and security 
procedures in US feedyards.  The USDA NAHMS Feedlot 99 survey21 asked several 
questions about non-employee restrictions, wildlife control, water trough maintenance, 
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 and feedstuff storage. In reference to security, it was reported that 18% of feedyards 
restricted movement of people on the feedyard.  Larger feedyards (25.6%) were more 
likely to restrict movement of people than smaller feedyards (15.5%).  Controlling 
unauthorized visitors from access to the feedyard may help to prevent both unintentional 
and intentional types of disease introduction.  Determining the purpose of the visit, 
previous animal contact, and the destination within the feedyard may help deter feed 
contamination or contagious disease introduction.  Feedyard management may want to 
escort visitors to prevent access to restricted areas and to deter accidental or malicious 
disease introduction.  Consideration should be given to the cleanliness of the visitor’s 
footwear because of the potential for introduction of pathogens in feces carried on 
contaminated footwear.  Visitors should not be allowed to have direct contact with 
feedstuffs or cattle.  
One way to secure feedstuffs is to store them in a sealed container.  In the Feedlot 
99 survey21 feedyards reported using sealed containers (silos, tanks, bins, drums) to store 
protein supplements (86.3% of feedyards), fat supplements (36.0% of feedyards), feed 
additives (64.7%of feedyards), and energy concentrate (65.1% of feedyards).  Remaining 
feedyards stored these feedstuffs in piles, bunks, and pits that are easily accessible once 
entry was gained inside the perimeter fence.  Locking the supplements within containers 
or behind a fence may deter malicious intentional feed contamination.  Discussion on this 
subject is continued later. 
Diseases shed in feces, urine, or saliva can be transmitted by contamination of the 
drinking water source and subsequent ingestion by another animal.  In regards to 
biocontainment, over 95% of feedyards reported routinely cleaning water troughs.21  
Average days between cleanings for all feedlots ranged from 13 to 16 depending on the 
season of year.  Larger feedyards (>8,000 head) cleaned water troughs more often than 
smaller feedyards (1,000-7,999 head).21  Smith et al.22 found that draining, physically 
scrubbing and refilling did not change E. coli O157 levels in the water.  Draining, 
scrubbing and 15 minutes of chemical disinfection decreased coliform levels but they 
returned to pre-clean levels within 24 hours, suggesting the cattle were re-contaminating 
the water.  In order for this practice to decrease the risk of enteric disease transmission it 
may need to be performed every day or involve some continuous method of water 
 6
 treatment.  Daily disinfection of water troughs is not considered to be practical in a 
commercial feedyard.   
 
Biosecurity 
 
Biosecurity was defined earlier as management strategies for prevention of 
disease entry which are different for each animal production system.6  Feedyards accept 
various degrees of risk depending on the different sources of cattle imported, but 
observing cattle at arrival will help determine their arrival state of health and may reduce 
the risk of importing disease into the feedyard.  Griffin23 suggested a health certificate 
should be required on all purchased cattle.  Sanderson et al.24 recommend receiving 
animals in the daylight for better assessment of health at the time of unloading.   
Traditional biosecurity involves controlling introduction of disease by quarantine 
and testing of imports prior to introduction to the resident herd.  During a quarantine 
period, animals should be monitored for signs of illness, tested and vaccinated to match 
the immune status of the herd.  If animals cannot be kept on another site, they should be 
kept on the edge of the premises away from contact with other cattle.  They should not 
share bunk space, water source or a fenceline.25  Pens should be sloped so runoff does not 
enter other pens occupied with resident herd cattle.  Most feedyards keep cattle in the 
receiving facility until they are processed and within three days they are introduced to the 
rest of the cattle and placed in their home pen.  The idea of quarantine may not be well 
accepted because facility design will not support separation of cattle for a long period of 
time when the optimal goal is to keep every pen full.25
A quarantine period also allows time for testing cattle for potential high risk 
diseases.25  Testing cattle on arrival at the feedyard is impractical for most diseases with 
the possible exception of bovine viral diarrhea virus (BVDV).  This disease will be 
discussed in further detail later.  However, feedyards will likely continue to import cattle 
that have been commingled with other cattle at the auction market without testing or a 
period of isolation. 
 . 
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 Biocontainment 
 
Cleaning and Disinfection 
 As Elbakidze26 states, prevention or biosecurity is most desirable, but not always 
attainable, so detection and control or biocontainment in the face of an outbreak are also 
important.  Instructing visitors about the risks and asking them to comply with practices 
aimed at reducing exposure is central to these biosecurity strategies.  Non-feedyard 
personnel should enter only after compliance with policies limiting exposure to potential 
fomites.  Clean coveralls, clean boots or foot covering should be used if visitors have 
soiled clothing or boots.  Visitor vehicles should be kept off the facility or entry should 
be permitted only after thorough cleaning and disinfection.  Dead animals should be 
picked up on the periphery of the facility to keep the rendering truck from introducing 
disease. 
Stevenson et al.27 suggested that the facilities where processing or treatment 
occurs may be a source of disease dissemination if they are not cleaned and disinfected 
after each use. They also suggested that transmission will be more likely when animals 
are allowed direct contact with infected animals, such as within the same pen or by fence 
line contact between adjacent pens.  This may also be an issue for contact between the 
hospital pen cattle and healthy cattle.  Regular cleaning and disinfection is a cornerstone 
to decreasing risk of disease transmission.28  Gross contamination must be removed and 
washed away for disinfectants to work properly.  Both viral agents such as foot-and-
mouth disease (FMDV) and bacterial agents such at Mycobacterium bovis and 
Salmonella can survive outside the host, especially in areas of high traffic such as the 
processing barn.  
According to Buhman et al.,29 sanitation should encompass every vehicle on the 
feedyard.  The equipment used for handling feedstuffs should not be used for anything 
else whenever possible.  Only the loader and feed trucks should be permitted in the pit 
silo and feed trucks should maintain a distance of at least 100 feet from the working face 
of the feedstuff. Vehicles and loaders used for dead stock should be cleaned and 
disinfected before leaving the animal disposal area to prevent pathogen dissemination to 
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 other parts of the facility.  This area should be located on the periphery of the feedyard 
where animals can be easily accessible to the rendering company without driving across 
the normal feedyard traffic pattern. 
Diseases endemic to the feedyard such as Salmonellosis can be shed in saliva and 
become a risk for indirect disease transmission.  Oral treatment equipment should be 
cleaned and disinfected after each animal to prevent transmission of pathogens shed in 
saliva.30  Store the equipment in clean, dry areas, avoiding permanent storage in 
disinfectant baths.  Disinfectant baths have been blamed for disease transmission after the 
baths were inactivated by organic debris.  Minimize the usage of oral treatment 
equipment whenever possible to reduce risk of indirect transmission.29
 
Segregation 
Buhman et al.29 noted the importance of minimizing the commingling of cattle, 
especially after arrival at the feedyard.  The authors recommended returning cattle as 
soon as possible to the home pen after treatment to minimize transfer of infectious agents 
between pens through direct nose-to-nose contact.   
 
Security 
 
Security begins with identifying the factors posing the biggest threat in terms of 
both likelihood and impact.  Threats to the feedyard may include everything from theft of 
feed, supplies or cattle by disgruntled neighbors, employees or activist groups intending 
to make a statement of their ideology.  Potential threats should be evaluated in reference 
to the likelihood of occurrence.  Animal agriculture has been consistently antagonized by 
groups like the Earth Liberation Front (ELF), Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and People 
for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA).  Domestic terrorists like PETA have 
publicly stated they would welcome FMDV into the United States primarily because they 
believe it would be good to relieve production animals from their captivity and 
suffering.31  It is uncertain how many resources should be devoted to prevention of 
domestic terrorism in feedyards.  However, it is clear domestic terrorist groups have 
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 demonstrated they will resort to extreme measures in an attempt to publicize their views 
and influence public policy.  In 2003, members of ELF were blamed for burning a 206 
unit apartment complex in San Diego, CA when a banner was left that read, “if you build 
it we will burn it”.  The damage was estimated at $50 million dollars.32   
In contrast, international terrorists may use a bioterrorism agent for the potential 
trade restriction and negative consequences on the US economy.33,34  Al Qaeda 
documents found during execution of the war in Afghanistan indicate anthrax has been 
considered as an agent of bioterrorism.35,36  Although motives of terror groups may stem 
from religious, political, or ecological beliefs, the methods of preventing an intentionally 
introduced disease or toxin remain similar and challenging.  Understanding the real risks 
faced by feedyards is difficult because there is no data available on the risk of a terrorist 
disease introduction. 
Historically toxins have been used to intentionally contaminate feed ingredients 
fed to animals.  While it may not be considered bioterrorism, cattle have been casualties 
of several malevolent events.  In March of 1970, members of the Ku Klux Klan were 
blamed for poisoning cattle via the water source with cyanide.  The thirty cattle that died 
from cyanide poisoning were owned by a group of Black Muslims in Alabama.37  This 
example suggests it may be important for access to wells and storage tanks to remain 
locked so they cannot be contaminated and result in widespread dissemination of a toxin 
or disease agent.   
Neher38 recounts a December 1996 incident where chlordane, a pesticide, was 
used to intentionally adulterate liquid fat at a feedstuff manufacturer that supplied feed to 
more than 4,000 farmers in Wisconsin, Minnesota, Michigan, and Illinois.  Milk from 
dairies receiving contaminated feed had already been processed into other products such 
as cheese, butter, and ice cream at the time of the investigation.  Samples taken from the 
farms and animals at slaughter were either negative or well below the concentration 
considered unsafe for human consumption.  The resulting recall of 4,000 tons of feed and 
500,000 pounds of fat however cost nearly $4 million dollars.  In the spring of 1997, a 
customer of the same feed manufacturer received a threat regarding contamination at the 
plant.  Learning from the first incident, the plant had instituted additional quality 
assurance measures to test for contaminants before distributing the products.  A fungicide 
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 called folpet was identified as the chemical used to contaminate materials.  The 
contaminated materials were destroyed and no manufactured products were contaminated 
as a result.  This event indicates that on-site security at the manufacturer and quality 
assurance testing are necessary and valuable to prevent costly recalls.  Feedyards may 
consider evaluating the quality assurance methods used by their feedstuff suppliers 
including requiring high risk feed suppliers to have a hazard analysis critical control point 
(HACCP) plan to prevent feed contamination.  
In 1981, 135 Wisconsin beef cattle were intoxicated by organophosphate 
insecticide after someone poured a bag of insecticide into a silo, contaminating the silage 
within.38  While no one was prosecuted, only 4 animals survived the incident.  The event 
was suspected to have been the result of a grudge toward the farmer.  On-site security on 
the feedyard that limits outside access to feedstuffs may prevent incidents like this one.  
Feedyards cannot control access to feedstuffs prior to delivery, but once a commodity is 
delivered to the facility it should be protected from contamination.   
More recently in April 2003, a Nebraska cattleman lost 250 head of cattle do to 
organophosphate poisoning.39  This incident was thought to be intentional, but there were 
no conclusive findings in the investigation. Again there was reason to believe the incident 
may have been the result of a grudge against the feedyard owner.  Losses were estimated 
at $120,000.  The person responsible for feeding the cattle denied the possibility of 
accidental feed contamination because there were no organophosphates stored on the 
facility.40  Evidence that all cattle were fed at the same time, but only pens fed from the 
first load of feed were contaminated suggesting the toxin may have been present in the 
truck.  Feeding equipment should also be secured to prevent opportunity for feed 
contamination in this way.   
Intentional disease introduction is a crime feedyards should address.  Security of 
feedstuffs and quality control are important before feedstuffs enter the facility, but are not 
the sole responsibility of the feedyard.  HACCP programs implemented by feed suppliers 
are necessary for control of risk for feed at this stage.  However, after arrival at the 
facility, security measures such as locking feedstuffs in storage containers, bins, or 
behind fences may deter contamination.  Feed trucks, feed mills, and micro-ingredient 
handling equipment should be secured as well.  As mentioned earlier, feedyards are 
 11
 storing some feed ingredients in sealed containers, but more security is needed to prevent 
access to those containers.21
   
Swine model 
 
Other animal production systems may provide information regarding effective 
biosecurity, biocontainment and security practices although not all practices from other 
systems are appropriate for feedyards because of differences in management systems, 
facility designs, disease agents, and species of animals.  Moore41 made the following 
recommendations regarding swine biosecurity and management of disease.   
Loading should be done on the edge of the facility.   
The facility for loading pigs should be cleaned and disinfected after each use.    
Dead animals should be placed outside the farm perimeter.    
Vehicles owned by rendering companies should be kept at least 1 mile away from 
the facility.   Dead stock should be taken to the pick up site using farm equipment.  
The facilities should be located on a dead end road as far as possible from major 
highways.   
Only one entrance should be used to the facility and the office should be in close 
proximity to the perimeter of the operation and the gate to monitor vehicles and 
incoming people.   
Visitors should be kept to a minimum and only allowed if they have not been 
around other pigs for 36 hours.   
They should sign in a log book with their name and the number of hours since and 
the location where they were last in contact with other pigs.41   
 
Another valuable resource to help understand effective practices utilized in the 
swine industry is Part One of the NAHMS 2001 swine survey42 which shows 65.5% of 
swine farms restricted entrance into the facility to employees only.  Of those facilities 
that permitted visitors, 52.1% required clean boots and coveralls, 23.6% required 24 
hours of downtime from other swine contact prior to entry and 9.3% required showers.  
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 Entry of outside trucks or trailers was allowed by 56.8% of swine operations in the 
survey, however of those that allowed entry of outside trailers, 65.4% required the 
interior of the trailers to be cleaned and 47% required the interior of the trailer to be 
disinfected.   
Some of the practices used in the swine industry are recommended in the feedyard 
industry as well.  Facility design should allow for cattle to be unloaded and loaded near 
the edge of the facility so if cattle are diseased they can be isolated from the resident 
herd.  It may be beneficial to clean and disinfect trailers at the source before loading 
incoming cattle since some research has suggested PRRSV of swine can be transmitted 
while animals are in a contaminated trailer.16  Cleaning and disinfecting transportation 
vehicles may be effective at reducing transmission diseases such as PRRSV and suggests 
these practices may be of benefit to limit exposure of cattle to pathogens on trailers as 
well.15  Some studies have shown these procedures may be beneficial at limiting 
transmission of FMDV as well.13
Another common principle is the placement of dead stock outside the perimeter of 
the feedyard which provides access for the rendering company so the truck does not have 
to enter the facility and introduce pathogen-laden drainage from diseased animals from 
another facility.  Except for delivery of feedstuffs, it would be beneficial for feedyards to 
be located out of the public eye to minimize visibility to a potential terrorist looking for a 
target.  Visibility may also be increased by advertising in trade publications as well as the 
internet.  It is may also be wise to reduce the number of visitors and to keep a record 
those who do visit as a deterrent and to decrease the risk of introducing disease 
unintentionally.  The visitor log would be beneficial in an outbreak where traceability 
would be desirable.  Limiting access to the feedyard to personnel directly involved with 
the operation (i.e. transportation of cattle and commodities, service providers, cattle 
buyers) would certainly require fewer resources to be devoted to visitor security, but it is 
uncertain if risk of disease introduction would be significantly different.  More work is 
needed to determine the real risks guest visitors pose.  Access to the facility could be 
better controlled in a feedyard if they have only one entrance that may be monitored by 
office staff during regular business hours.   
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 Introduction of certain foreign animal diseases like FMD may require more 
stringent cleaning and disinfection protocols for individuals traveling between feedyards.  
Amass et al. 43 found that strict personal hygiene and changing of coveralls may be an 
appropriate replacement of lengthy periods of animal avoidance for one strain of FMDV.  
In a swine study of PRRSV Otake et al.44 found that contaminated hands, boots and 
coveralls may harbor PRRSV and infect other pigs upon exposure.  Sanitation procedures 
commonly used in the swine industry were effective in preventing transmission of 
PRRSV by fomites and the hands of personnel.  Similar procedures may be useful in 
preventing transmission in the feedyard, but much more work is needed to evaluate if 
these practices are applicable to endemic bovine diseases of concern. 
    
Poultry Model 
 
Another model to use for comparison of good management practices for 
biosecurity and biocontainment is the NAHMS Layers 1999 survey.45  This survey shows 
68.1% of operations did not allow non-business visitors to enter the chicken houses, 
11.7% did with sign in and 20.2% did without sign in.  Sixty-two percent of operations 
that allowed non-business visitors (such as friends, family members, tourists) did not 
allow access if they drove onto another poultry farm earlier that day.  Poultry farms 
restricted access to their operations by using gated entrances (16.5%), a perimeter fence 
(26.7%), and signage (72.9%) in addition to having animals housed within an enclosed 
building.   
Signage, fences and gates are a visual reminder to personnel and visitors that the 
animals are valuable for deterring unauthorized access.  Some poultry farms are utilizing 
on-site security measures  to limit access to the chicken barns.  It is conceivable that these 
measures may be useful in restricting access within feedyards.  Feedyards can further 
maximize security by locking gates when the facility is left unattended. 
 
 
Dairy Model  
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The USDA NAHMS 2002 dairy survey46 indicated that 75.5% of dairies required 
no testing of purchased cattle.  Only 20.5% of dairy operations quarantined cattle on 
arrival at the dairy.  Only 5.1% of dairy farms had written specific biosecurity and 
biocontainment strategies.  Almost all dairy producers (97.9%) reported they would 
contact their local veterinarian if they suspected a foreign animal disease on their 
operation.  No visitors were allowed on 13.5% of diaries.  Disposable boots were 
available for visitors in 16.3% of dairy operations.  Some (38.6%) dairies included in the 
survey had guidelines that set conditions for visitor access to cattle.47  Outside vehicles 
had restricted access to the cattle in 44.2% of dairies.  Of dairies with more than 30 dairy 
cows, only 42.1% trained personnel in biosecurity and biocontainment practices.  
Equipment was used for both feed and manure handling in 58.8% of dairies.  Only 5.7% 
of dairies cleaned and disinfected equipment after hauling manure when the same 
equipment was also used for feedstuffs.  
This model may have even less in common with the feedyard industry aside from 
a commonality of species as compared to the above mentioned models.  Population 
turnover is much slower in dairies than the meat production systems.  Some testing on 
arrival is done in the dairy system.  Villarroel et al.20 recommends dairy cattle be tested 
for diseases such as BVDV and Johne’s disease prior to introduction. 
Testing cattle in the feedyard is impractical with most diseases with the possible 
exception of BVDV.  Persistently infected cattle can be identified using an ear notch 
sample and results can be known within 12 hours of submitting the sample, depending on 
the laboratory doing the testing.  The effects of persistently infected (PI) BVD calves on 
pen morbidity are a controversial topic of discussion.  O’Connor et al.48 found that PI 
cattle were not associated with increased disease prevalence among commingled groups 
while Loneragan et al.49 found there to be increased incidence of respiratory disease in 
cattle that had contact with PI individuals.    Feedyards will of necessity continue to 
import cattle that have been commingled with other cattle at the auction market without 
testing or a period of isolation. 
Quarantine and isolation is another principle of traditional biosecurity programs.  
While only one-fifth of dairies quarantine, recommendations are to keep new cattle 
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 separate from the resident herd for 30 days before introduction.25  During this period, 
animals should be monitored for signs of illness, tested and if necessary vaccinated to 
match the immune status of the herd.  If animals cannot be kept on another site, they 
should be kept on the edge of the premises away from contact with other cattle.  The 
resident herd should not share bunk space, water sources, fence lines, and should not be 
exposed to drainage from the quarantine pen.25   
Most feedyards keep cattle in the receiving area until they are processed 
(vaccinated, dewormed, identified, and possibly implanted, castrated and/or dehorned .  
Within three days of arrival they are introduced to the rest of the cattle and placed in their 
home pen.  The idea of quarantine may not be well accepted because facility design will 
not support separation of cattle for a long period of time when the optimal goal is to keep 
every pen full. 
Results from the USDA NAHMS 2002 dairy survey show dairies that allowed 
visitors sometimes required disposable boots to be worn.  Biosecurity practices regarding 
clean boots and outer clothing have been previously recommended for dairies.25  This 
practice is particularly important if fecal contamination of clothing or shoes occurs.  
Feedyards should also instruct personnel and visitors to avoid walking across feed bunks 
or in feed storage areas because of the risk of fecal-oral transmission of diseases like 
Salmonellosis. Restricting visitors and vehicles from accessing cattle is a good 
biosecurity practice.  If vehicles are allowed on the dairy, Wells et al.25 suggests they 
should be cleaned and disinfected before entry to decrease the risk of indirect 
transmission by a contaminated vehicle.  Similarly, signage at the feedyard will give 
feedyard personnel an opportunity to enforce cleaning and disinfection procedures and 
reduce the likelihood of indirect disease transmission.  Prevention of unauthorized access 
in this way may decrease risk of accidental disease introduction.   
Cleaning and disinfection must be central to activities in any facility that uses 
equipment for both feed handling and for hauling manure.  Only a small number of 
dairies disinfected equipment used for both manure and feed handling, contrary to 
recommendations by experts to keep equipment used for hauling manure away from 
feedstuffs.25  Feedyards may be using equipment for both tasks because smaller 
operations cannot justify purchasing equipment to be dedicated to a single task. 
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 Less than half of the dairies trained personnel in biosecurity and biocontainment 
practices.  Villarroel et al.20 suggested guidelines in dairies should be structured in a way 
similar to a HACCP system where a risk assessment is conducted to identify areas were 
disease transmission could be controlled.  These guidelines apply directly to the feedyard 
industry as well and should be practiced by the feedyard management and veterinarian to 
better control disease risk.  Prevention strategies are written for each control point and a 
method of monitoring is used to evaluate the effectiveness of each strategy.  Not all 
measures will be practical or economically feasible depending on the operation.  
Evaluation of the cost-benefit ratio for biosecurity and biocontainment practices is 
important.  However, some practices may directly benefit an operation’s production 
efficiency and reduce clinical disease providing the foundation for a more profitable 
operation.6  Plans will also be different dependent on the pathogen considered and the 
desired relative risk reduction.  The next step is writing a procedural outline for personnel 
to follow when an actionable animal disease is suspected. 
More research is needed to understand the value of these practices in feedyards.  
Dairies typically have a much lower turnover in personnel than feedyards, but some of 
the principles mentioned above will be useful in both operations.  Poultry and swine 
production practices may be useful in some cases.  It is important to note the differences 
between agents and industries that make a large impact on which biosecurity and 
biocontainment strategies should be adopted by feedyards.  Research is needed to further 
characterize the value of these strategies. 
 
Foreign Animal Disease 
Foot and Mouth Disease 
Of all the bovine diseases, FMD is one of the most contagious bovine viruses and 
would cause the most disruption of the US economy if introduced.  In one survey 
veterinarians considered this disease to be the most likely agent to be introduced by a 
terrorist.7  Feedyard biosecurity and security practices should be written so that if FMDV 
enters the US, mitigation strategies can be implemented to prevent introduction of disease 
into individual production units.  
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 Foot-and-mouth disease is best known for the vesicular lesions found in the 
mouth that result in inappetance and excessive salivation.  Lesions are also located at the 
coronary band resulting in lameness, and on the teats.  Although the disease is rarely fatal 
in adults, morbidity is nearly 100%.    
There are seven serotypes of FMDV with over 60 subtypes.  There is no cross-
protection between serotypes.  This lack of cross protection is a challenge when 
designing a vaccine.50  Bates et al.51 suggested vaccinating might be more economical 
than slaughter if it was possible to differentiate between vaccinated and naturally-infected 
animals assuming that a vaccine stockpile was available for use and contained the 
serotype of the strain involved in the outbreak.  Vaccine production, storage, and efficacy 
should be evaluated before considering vaccination as a method of FMDV eradication.   
The rate of disease spread will be an important factor in determining the cost of 
an outbreak.26  The rate of FMDV spread depends upon the spatial distribution of 
animals, the species of animals present and the size of the operations themselves.52  
Contact rates between ranches and farms should be analyzed to better understand the rate 
of spread.  Immediate action should be taken to decrease the rate of commingling in the 
case of disease introduction.  Preventing animal contact with animals in other herds is an 
important method used to decrease the number of animals infected, culled, and the 
duration of the outbreak.52
Keeling et al.52 found that control strategies need to occur at the very onset of the 
outbreak to be effective by using Monte Carlo simulation.  Taking immediate action 
would be a challenge, dependent upon early detection and effective response.  Doing so 
would reduce the number of cases, the number of animals that need to be depopulated, 
and the duration of the outbreak. 
Detection requires identification to locate animals with a history of contact with 
infected animals.  Disney et al.53 suggested that improved animal identification may 
reduce foreign animal disease (FAD) consequences and justify implementation of the 
system improvements needed in cattle operations.  Additional benefits included increased 
consumer confidence in the cattle industry and associated premiums to producers for herd 
disease certification.53
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 Cost of FMDV introduction 
Many economists have attempted to estimate costs associated with an FMDV 
outbreak.  Since the last outbreak in the US occurred in 1929, it is difficult to assess how 
the economy would react.  One of the immediate impacts of an FMDV introduction to the 
US would be the immediate loss of export markets.  The December 2003 case of bovine 
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) dropped export quantities 82% below the $3.95 billion 
value for 2003.  The estimated losses associated with BSE in 2004 from exportation of 
beef and offal ranged from $3.2 to $4.7 billion.54
On a national level, lost jobs, complying with described regulations and 
responding to the outbreaks would be costly.26  The economic destruction of an 
introduction of FMDV would include cost of preventative measures to decrease spread 
coupled with the loss of consumers and a surplus of beef.26  International exports would 
be limited and the U.S. would lose the 50-60% premium paid for beef resulting from the 
U.S.’s FMDV free, vaccination free countries.55  Cupp et al.56 estimated direct and 
indirect costs associated with the accidental introduction of FMDV into the United 
Kingdom in 2001 cost approximately 11 billion US dollars.  Knowles et al.31 estimated 
losses from an introduction of FMDV in the United States to be $14 billion while 
Paarlberg et al.57 estimated the costs to be as high as $60 billion.  One disease model used 
to evaluate the impact of FMDV introduction in southwest Kansas showed that the more 
animal identification and records were available during an outbreak, the lower the costs 
associated with FMDV.58
While there are other foreign animal disease risks, FMDV is included in the Class 
A listing by the Office International des Epizooties (OIE) because of high morbidity and 
ease of dissemination.56  The U.S. has not experienced an outbreak since 1929, but with 
the globalization of society, it seems it is only a matter of time before the US faces an 
outbreak.  Feedyard personnel should be trained to recognize and respond to a FMDV 
outbreak.   
   
First Responders 
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   Foreign animal disease agents will likely be first discovered by livestock 
managers, although it may be difficult for them to identify the disease without training.59  
Once they recognize an unusual syndrome they will need to contact their local 
veterinarian who will contact the Animal Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) 
Veterinary Service (VS) for confirmation and sample collection.  Collection of diagnostic 
samples will be done by a foreign animal disease diagnostician (FADD).  The samples 
will be sent to a National Veterinary Services Laboratory in either Ames, IA or Plum 
Island, NY for diagnosis of disease and identification of the infectious agent.   
The producer, federally accredited veterinarian, state animal health agency, and 
APHIS must work together for early detection, control and eradication.  If an exotic 
disease outbreak occurs, USDA Veterinary Services has an Eastern and Western 
Regional Emergency Animal Disease Eradication Organization (READEO).  These 
organizations help coordinate efforts among all parties involved in the eradication efforts.  
They are trained in confirming the presence of disease, animal appraisal, humane 
euthanasia and disposal, and ensure proper cleaning and disinfection of premises where 
infected animals were kept.  If an exotic disease is suspected to be introduced as an act of 
terror, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) becomes the lead agency. 
  
Endemic Disease 
 
Some diseases are endemic to the feedyard population.  Research has been done 
to better understand the sources of diseases like Salmonellosis and BVD.  Biosecurity and 
biocontainment practices may help decrease morbidity associated with these diseases.  
Managers may be more willing to adopt procedures to prevent diseases they know 
currently reside in their feedyards. 
Bovine Viral Diarrhea Virus 
Bovine viral diarrhea virus (BVDV) is introduced to feedyards primarily by the 
introduction of persistently infected (PI) animals.  It is estimated that the prevalence of 
PIs in the US beef herd ranges from 0.13-2.0%.60  Feedyard cattle have multiple 
opportunities to be exposed to PIs during transport, commingling during marketing and at 
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 the feedyard itself.  Cattle can transmit the virus by direct nose-to-nose contact or through 
indirect contact with fomites such as processing facilities and oral treatment equipment.  
Within the feedyard, exposure to BVDV PI animals can cause immune-suppression 
leading to respiratory disease in animals with a naïve immunity for BVDV.  Strategies to 
prevent morbidity associated with BVDV include testing and removal of positive animals 
prior to introduction to the feedyard.  The economic value of this strategy is 
controversial.48,49
Salmonellosis 
Salmonella is an organism that is endemic in feedyards.  The NAHMS 1999  
Feedyard survey reported a prevalence of 6.3% by fecal culture in feedyard cattle.61  
Surveys report an infection rate of 13-15% in beef cattle in New Zealand.62  
Salmonellosis is usually transmitted by ingestion of feedstuffs or water contaminated by 
fecal waste from an infected animal.  The ability for enteric agents like Salmonella to 
survive in the environment makes transmission more difficult to control.  Animals with 
diarrhea can shed up to 108 Salmonella per gram of feces.63  Plym-Forshell et al.64 
showed Salmonella dublin survived in dried manure on the wall of an old barn for over 5 
years on both concrete and rubber surfaces.  The same research team isolated Salmonella 
typhimurium from a slurry pit that had been empty for 4 years.64  Because of the survival 
of Salmonella in feces it is also important for feedyard personnel to avoid walking in the 
bunk with manure contaminated boots.  Personnel should clean manure from the tires of 
equipment and vehicles before driving through feed storage areas.  Equipment used to 
handle carcasses or manure should not be used to handle feedstuffs.65  Proper cleaning 
and disinfection is important to minimize disease transmission by equipment in the 
feedyard. 
Salmonella are also shed by cattle in salivary and nasal secretions, making proper 
cleaning and disinfection of oral treatment equipment important in preventing disease 
transmission.  Removal of the organic material is necessary before the disinfectant 
maximum efficacy can be achieved.28    
It has been estimated that Salmonella bacteria contaminate 40-50% of protein 
supplements used in the dairy industry.63  It is also present in some forages, but proper 
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 ensiling will create an environment unfavorable for growth.65  Estimates for feedstuffs 
used in the feedyard may be similar to those from the dairy industry.   Fedorka-Cray et 
al.66 found Salmonella spp. as a contaminant in 22.5% of pig feed trucks and 23.5% of 
pig feed.  Feed trucks should be sanitized with hot water and disinfectants between loads 
to minimize the risk of transmission.66
 
Education 
 
Veterinarians can play a crucial role in biosecurity and biological risk assessment.  
Wenzel and Nusbaum67 describe the importance of the veterinarian as a skilled, 
knowledgeable leader when an outbreak of disease requires a quick response.  
Veterinarians as defined by the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 are first 
responders responsible for protecting and preserving life, property, public health, and 
providing clinical care.68  Their role in providing leadership in the application of an 
eradication program will be important during an emergency outbreak of disease.  The 
therapy delivered during an emergency could be very critical to the longevity and 
duration of the disease.  Veterinarians can gain information about disaster management to 
supplement their current knowledge of foreign animal diseases from the American 
Veterinary Medical Association69 and from the Animal Plant and Health Inspection 
Service.70  Unfortunately, a shortage of veterinarians has been predicted among the 
agencies that oversee public health and the care of food animals.71
 
Contribution of this Research 
 
There is little research data available in the area of feedyard biosecurity, 
biocontainment, and security.  Objective data on real versus perceived risk is difficult to 
obtain for intentional disease introduction risks.   Data about endemic agents in feedyards 
are more readily available but still limited.  Some data is available on current practices in 
other animal production systems.  Unique characteristics of the design of feedyards and 
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 the management of the cattle make adoption of some practices difficult or impractical.  
More research is needed to understand which practices will be economically rewarding. 
Gathering data through surveys is an effective way to determine what the current 
biosecurity practices are in feedyards.  Surveys also help identify perceptions held by 
industry representatives about biological threats, routes of introduction, and the 
importance of mitigation strategies aimed at prevention or control.  The results of this 
work will provide benchmarks for feedyard managers in the areas of biocontainment, 
biosecurity and security.  Consulting veterinarians can use this information for 
comparison when making recommendations in these areas. 
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CHAPTER 2 - Feedyard Manager and Veterinarian Responses 
to a Feedyard Biosecurity Survey 
Abstract 
 
A Delphi-like survey series was used to gain knowledge about feedyard 
biosecurity and security from feedyard managers and feedyard veterinarians.  A panel of 
managers and a panel of veterinarians were selected after being recommended as experts 
in the industry.  Three rounds of the same survey were used to gather consensus opinion 
from each expert panel about perceived disease risks and mitigation strategies.  The two 
groups were given the same survey with two additional questions about domestic and 
international terrorists asked of veterinarians.  Results showed veterinarians and 
managers have very similar views on the likelihood of disease caused by terrorism, 
natural introduction, or accidental introduction and on the importance of on-site security.  
Both groups agreed that foot-and-mouth disease virus (FMDV) or toxins would be the 
most likely agents to be introduced by a terrorist.  Respondent groups disagreed on the 
importance of preventative products, disease transmission control, and environmental 
control.  Most of the differences can be attributed to the veterinarians placing less 
importance on the aforementioned categories when considering likely routes of 
introduction for diseases considered in the survey.  Difference in awareness of these 
issues is significant because veterinarians are pivotal in educating the feedyard staff about 
the prevention of disease entry and transmission. 
 33
  
Introduction 
 
Biosecurity and security are important aspects of disease prevention in any 
agricultural production system.  Feedyards are particularly vulnerable to disease 
introduction because of the large number of cattle procured annually from multiple 
sources, as well as the large concentration of animals in one place.1  Further, feedyards 
are mostly outdoor facilities with the exceptions of a few total confinement facilities.  
Unlike the indoor, total confinement operations in the swine industry, with this natural 
environment comes a large perimeter that is much harder to control.  The high cattle 
turnover rate in the feedyard allow new cattle arrivals to introduce pathogens and be 
exposed to pathogens already at the yard, making it difficult or impractical to control 
disease introduction to the feedyard in some instances.  The high concentration of 
animals in a feedyard is a potentially attractive target for bioterrorism by domestic or 
international terror groups.  The extensive perimeter of a typical feedyard provides 
numerous opportunities for unauthorized entry to the feedyard by individuals or groups 
with malicious intent.  If the goal of the terror group was to damage the economy of the 
beef industry and the United States in general, large numbers of cattle could be infected 
by selected agents with a relatively small amount of resources or time.  The economic 
losses that accompany the treatment or elimination of a toxic (i.e. organophosphate) or 
infectious (i.e. foot-and-mouth disease virus (FMDV)) agent in a feedyard would be 
substantial.  These issues highlight the need for appropriate security and biosecurity 
practices in feedyards.       
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 This paper discusses the findings from a survey of two expert groups associated 
with the feedyard industry: feedyard veterinarians and feedyard managers.  The 
information from these experts is a valuable resource for determining the current 
understanding of real and perceived threats to feedyard security as well as strategies to 
minimize routes of disease introduction.  The purpose of this survey was to utilize the 
knowledge of feedyard veterinarians and feedyard managers to determine the importance 
of different aspects of biosecurity/security in feedyards using a Delphi-like survey.   
Materials and Methods 
Survey development 
A Delphi-like survey series was submitted to feedyard veterinarians and managers 
of Central Plains feedyards to assess expert knowledge and opinion regarding security 
and biosecurity risks and practices.  The survey followed the iterative nature of a Delphi 
survey, but without the exploration phase employed in a traditional Delphi survey.  
Experts responded directly to pre-established questions regarding disease introduction 
and mitigation strategies.  Questions were asked about the probability of accidental, 
natural, and terrorist introduction of specific disease agents or toxins.  Natural 
introduction was defined as one in which human activity is not directly involved such as 
an introduction of disease agents by wildlife or introduction of toxins by mechanical 
failure.  Accidental introduction was defined as involving direct but unintentional human 
activity such as an introduction of a disease agent by unclean boots or introduction of 
toxins by feed mixing errors.  Terrorist introduction was defined as involving intentional 
human activity to introduce a disease agent or toxin.  Six choices were provided for 
respondents to rank the probability of each agent’s introduction by accidental, natural and 
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 terrorist means.  Respondent choices were: very high probability, high probability, 
moderate probability, low probability, no probability and I don’t know, represented by 
the numbers 1-6 respectively. 
Questions were also asked about the importance of preventative products 
(available vaccines, dewormers, antibiotics and veterinary health care), environmental 
control (wildlife control, bird control, insect control, cleaning procedures and 
decontamination procedures), disease transmission control (isolation of incoming animals 
and isolation of sick animals), and on-site security (guards, fences, movement of vehicles 
on the property, traffic control, employee screening and employee education) in 
minimizing the probability of introduction of disease into a feedyard.  Again, six choices 
were provided for respondents to rank the importance of preventative products, 
environmental control, disease transmission control, and on-site security for each agent.  
Respondent choices were: very high importance, high importance, moderate importance, 
low importance, not important and I don’t know, represented by the numbers 1-6 
respectively.   
Fourteen disease agents and toxins were considered for each question (Tables 1-
2).  Feedyard managers and veterinarians were given the same survey (total of 98 
possible responses) with the addition of two questions in the veterinary survey (total of 
107 possible responses).  The additional questions asked veterinarians about security 
measures and risks associated with domestic and international terrorist groups.  
Veterinarians were provided one free form response question for other comments.    
Initially, six feedyard managers were chosen to pre-test the design of the survey 
and the clarity of the questions.  Four managers reviewed and commented on the survey 
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 structure and clarity.  Revisions were made and the survey was prepared for data 
collection.  The survey was approved by the Kansas State University Institutional Review 
Board committee for Research Involving Human Subjects prior to submission to the 
participants.  A copy of the survey is available from the corresponding author. 
Cooperator recruitment 
Nineteen Central Plains feedyard managers were recommended for inclusion by 
academic and consulting feedyard veterinarians.  Based on recommendations by 
academic veterinarians associated with the beef industry, 15 veterinarians in consulting 
practice, academia, and industry were recommended for the survey.  Both groups were 
contacted by phone, given an explanation of why they were selected as well as a 
description of the survey series and asked to participate.  
Survey conduct 
In order to maximize response the survey was offered to managers and 
veterinarians as either an electronic survey utilizing the Kansas State University on-line 
survey system or as a hard copy sent by mail.  Participants were allowed to respond by 
whichever means they preferred.  Reminders were emailed every five days for three 
weeks or until the participants completed the survey.  If necessary, participants were also 
contacted by phone to encourage completion of the survey.  Three rounds of the same 
survey were given to each feedyard manager and veterinarian.  Following each round, 
median responses were calculated for each question and each group separately (feedyard 
managers and veterinarians).  Therefore, the second round had the same question set 
including the median response to each question from the first round.  This process was 
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 repeated again providing the median scores from the second round of the survey to 
cooperators and eliciting their answers for the third round.   
Analysis 
The third round median responses were calculated and summarized for each 
question and each group for comparison utilizing a commercially available spreadsheet 
program (Excel 2003, Microsoft Corp, Redmond, WA).  For questions where the median 
score of veterinarians and managers differed by more than 2, a Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
was used to determine if significant differences were present between the responses of 
the two groups.   
Results 
 
Of the 19 managers recommended for the survey, 18 managers contacted by 
phone agreed to participate in the survey.  A current phone number was not found for one 
manager.  One manager that agreed to cooperate was inadvertently dropped from the 
survey list.  The 17 managers surveyed represented KS (12), NE (2), and TX (3).  Of the 
15 veterinarians contacted 13 agreed to participate in the survey.  One veterinarian did 
not respond to messages and was not contacted and another did not consent.  The 13 
veterinarians surveyed represented KS (5), TX (2), NE (1), MO (1), OK (1), ID (1), CO 
(1), and IA (1).  Fourteen managers (82%) responded to the first round of surveys, 10/17 
(59%) responded to the second round, and 12/17 (71%) responded to the third round of 
surveys.  The reported manager response rate in the second round was lower than the 
actual response rate because some managers responded both electronically and by mail.  
The duplicate surveys could not be identified because of the anonymous nature of both 
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 methods, so only the electronic surveys were used.  All cooperating veterinarians 
responded to the first round of surveys, 11/13 (85%) responded to the second round, and 
9/13 (69%) veterinarians responded to the third round of surveys. 
A summary of the median responses from the third round of surveys are shown in 
Tables 1 and 2. Between the first and third rounds of the survey 29% of question specific 
median responses changed in the manager survey and 33% changed in the veterinarian 
survey.  Ranges narrowed in 71% (70/98) of the manager’s responses, and in 68% 
(73/107) of the veterinarian’s question specific responses from the first to the third round 
of the survey.  Veterinarians and feedyard managers had similar views on the likelihood 
of disease introduction from terrorism, natural introduction, or accidental introduction, 
and on the importance of on-site security.  Veterinarian responses indicated preventative 
products, disease transmission control and environmental control to be less important in 
regards to minimizing the probability of disease introduction when compared to feedyard 
managers.  This difference between respondent groups was most consistent in the area of 
environmental control across all diseases included in the survey except salmonellosis and 
toxicosis (Table 2).   
Manager and veterinarian responses were significantly different when asked about 
the importance of environmental control in minimizing the probability of introduction of 
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) (p<.05).  Veterinarians thought 
environmental control was not important, while managers thought environmental control 
was of high importance in minimizing the probability of introduction of BSE.  
Manager and veterinarian responses were also significantly different when asked 
about the importance of disease transmission control in minimizing the probability of 
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 introduction of Cysticercus bovis (p<.05).  Veterinarians thought disease transmission 
control was not important (range 4-5), while managers thought it was of high importance 
(range 1-2) in minimizing the probability of introduction of Cysticercus bovis. 
Veterinarians indicated they believed properly maintained perimeter fences and 
locked perimeter gates were very highly important, while they considered decreased 
feedyard visibility and decreased media exposure to be moderately important in 
preventing the probability of domestic or international terrorism (Table 3).  Veterinarians 
also believed feedyards had a very high probability of being attacked by a domestic 
terrorist group, and a high probability of being attacked by an international terrorist 
group.  Veterinarian free form responses indicated a recognition of the importance of feed 
source and feed storage security, of evaluating the economic feasibility of control 
measures and of raising the general level of awareness of these issues in feedyards.  
Discussion 
  
This Delphi-like survey method is useful for eliciting expert opinion in areas 
where relevant data from the scientific literature is scarce.2  Utilizing pre-existing 
questions effectively reduced the time commitment required by respondents to provide 
valid responses while maximizing response rate.  Within each peer group, question 
specific median responses from the previous round were provided to respondents for 
consideration during the last two rounds of the survey.  Participants answered the same 
survey multiple times which allowed them to reconsider their responses in light of their 
peer’s response to the same questions from the previous round.  Unlike a face-to-face 
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 round table discussion, individual responses are equally represented without the potential 
social pressure to agree with an out-spoken peer. 
Feedyard veterinarians noted the need for increased education and awareness of 
security and biosecurity issues.  The difference in responses between veterinarians and 
managers indicates an opportunity for consulting veterinarians to provide education to 
feedyard managers and staff on the relative importance of disease introduction risks and 
routes of transmission (Table 2).  This survey series identified environmental control of 
disease, disease transmission control, and preventative products as particular areas where 
perception of risk and effectiveness of mitigation strategies differs between feedyard 
managers and feedyard veterinarians.  For example, the difference between feedyard 
managers and veterinarians in the importance of preventive products and environmental 
control for BSE risk in the feedyard indicates an area of needed education.  There are no 
available preventive products for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) and while the 
agent may survive in the environment it seems more likely that BSE would be introduced 
through contaminated feedstuffs which would not be prevented through environmental 
control.   
The difference between the two groups when asked about Cysticercus bovis 
showed a similar difference of knowledge regarding the importance of disease 
transmission control.  Feedyard managers believed disease transmission control was of 
high importance for control of Cysticercus bovis risk in the feedyard while veterinarians 
believed disease transmission control was not important (range 4-5) in controlling 
Cysticercus bovis risk in the feedyard.  Humans are the host needed to complete the life 
cycle of this disease, so the route of transmission for Cysticercus bovis may fall more into 
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 the area of feedyard staff education and awareness.  The disease can be prevented if 
infected humans are not allowed to defecate in and contaminate animal feed.  By 
definition in this survey, disease transmission control included isolation of incoming 
animals and isolation of sick animals.  Feedyard managers are either unaware of the 
transmission of Cysticercus bovis or did not apply this description in categorizing the 
importance of disease transmission control for Cysticercus bovis.  
Differences in awareness of these issues are significant because veterinarians are 
pivotal in educating the feedyard staff about the prevention of disease entry and spread.  
If managers are not cognizant of the relative importance of interventions for biosecurity 
and security, they will benefit from additional expertise from consulting veterinarians in 
these areas.  Veterinarians should be experts on disease risks and routes of transmission 
in the feedyard. 
Veterinarians can provide training to managers and feedyard employees on 
security and biosecurity practices and the development of effective and economic plans.  
Although the managerial duties differ between feedyards, the managers share the role as a 
decision maker in all feedyards.  Decisions made by an informed manager will contribute 
to the health of the cattle and the success of the feedyard.  This survey provided 
information on the views of each group which are useful in developing effective security 
and biosecurity programs.  Development of a security program starts with a good 
understanding of the disease threats and routes of introduction.  The survey identified 
diseases that are perceived to be most threatening.  It has also identified some differences 
in knowledge between veterinarians and managers regarding disease transmission and 
provides guidance to veterinarians on what areas managers need additional training.  
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 Understanding the disease increases the effective application of practical and effective 
prevention protocols.   
Because of the high turnover of cattle in feedyard systems, some traditional 
biosecurity methods of preventing endemic disease introduction are not applicable.  
There are however security and biosecurity measures that may be warranted to prevent 
intentional introduction of disease agents and toxins.  Veterinarians recognized the need 
for increased awareness and security.  They considered some practices to be valuable 
deterrent measures, particularly perimeter fences and locked gates.  Veterinarians should 
communicate the perceived importance of these deterrents, however perimeter fences 
capable of stopping human access may be quite expensive and the cost benefit should be 
examined.  Further research is needed to quantify the value of specific deterrent practices 
in decreasing the likelihood of a terrorist introduction.  Relevant literature is lacking on 
the most important risks and the effectiveness of security and biosecurity risk mitigation 
strategies.3  Discussions and examination of general law enforcement and corporate data 
on the effectiveness of deterrent practices may be useful.  
Veterinarians and feedyard managers had similar views on the likelihood of 
disease introduction from terrorism, natural introduction, or accidental introduction, and 
on the importance of on-site security.  Both groups believed that FMDV was a high 
probability threat within the category of terrorist introduction.  Managers also thought 
anthrax was a high probability threat.  Al Qaeda documents found during execution of the 
war in Afghanistan indicate recognition of anthrax as an agent of bioterrorism.4-6 Despite 
the evidence of Al Qaeda intent to use anthrax, veterinarians thought anthrax to be a low 
probability event.  Clearly introduction of FMDV to the United States could have 
 43
 massive economic consequences.  The accidental introduction of FMDV into the United 
Kingdom in 2001 cost approximately 11 billion US dollars in direct and indirect costs.7  
Losses from an introduction of FMDV in the United States have been estimated from $14 
billion to $60 billion.8,9  Prevention of its introduction into the country is largely a 
function of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA).  Once introduced the 
USDA would implement its plan for response to a highly contagious disease including 
zones of eradication.10  Both veterinarians and managers agreed on-site security may be a 
valuable tool in deterring terrorists from introducing FMDV to a particular feedyard.  
However, if a neighboring feedyard is infected the “secure” feedyard may still be in the 
resulting quarantine and “stamping out” area.  According to the National Animal Health 
Monitoring System Feedlot 99 survey, only 18% of feedyards restrict movement of 
people on the facility for biosecurity/security purposes.11  If FMD is introduced to the US 
a ready plan to increase on-site security at the feedlot would be beneficial. 
Both groups believed toxins were a moderate to high probability threat from 
terrorist introduction.  Historical precedents exist for both intentional and accidental 
introduction of toxins into livestock feed.12 Contamination could occur at the feed 
manufacturing facility, subsequently exposing numerous livestock facilities.  This 
highlights the need for feedyards to preferentially deal with feed manufacturers that 
maintain security systems analogous to the Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points 
(HACCP) model.  Alternatively, toxins could be introduced directly to a particular 
feedyard by a terrorist group or by disgruntled neighbors, competitors or employees.  
Numerous domestic terrorist groups do exist and have made attacks on animal agriculture 
which suggests the importance of deterrent security measures.13  On-site security 
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 practices may make this more difficult to achieve and deter all but the most determined 
attempts or send the terrorist off to an “easier” facility.  
The information gathered in this survey is not sufficient to identify all the data 
necessary to make economic decisions regarding security and prevention of disease 
introduction.  It does provide an understanding of the perception of potential threats to 
the feedyard industry.  Groups like the Earth Liberation Front, Animal Liberation Front 
and People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals are active antagonists of animal 
agriculture of all species.  They have publicly stated they would welcome FMDV into the 
United States primarily because they believe it would be good to relieve production 
animals from their captivity and suffering.9  In contrast, international terrorists may use a 
bioterrorism agent for the potential detrimental effects on the economy of the United 
States.13,14
Assessing the economic value of biosecurity and security plans is challenging 
because good estimates of the probability of a terrorist event are lacking.  While we have 
some historical precedent of feed poisoning, the probability that a domestic or 
international terrorist group would employ these techniques is unknown.  Clearly 
domestic terrorist groups have shown themselves willing to resort to extreme measures in 
an attempt to publicize their views and influence public policy.15  
Conclusion 
 
Objective data on real versus perceived risk is difficult to obtain for terrorist 
disease introduction risks.  However, bioterrorism agents such as anthrax have been 
considered by Al Qaeda, suggesting that protective measures may be needed.4-6  
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 Objective data on natural or accidental disease introduction risk and impact is more 
available but still incomplete.16-18  Further data from experimental studies and disease 
modeling would be helpful to further characterize these risks and impacts.  Additional 
knowledge of the probability and magnitude of risks and the effectiveness of mitigation 
strategies is needed for risk assessment and the development of economic and effective 
biosecurity plans for feedyards.  The results reported here are helpful in further 
understanding risk perception in the feedyard from those who likely know it best.  
Recognition of educational and training needs will help veterinarians to direct 
implementation of rational biosecurity and security plans on feedyards.  
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Table 1 - Comparison of Managers and Veterinarian Responses* to Probability of 
Disease Introduction by Terrorist, Natural, or Accidental Introduction. 
 Terrorist Introduction Natural Introduction Accidental Introduction 
Diseases Managers Veterinarians Managers Veterinarians Managers Veterinarians 
Anthrax 2 4 4 4 4 4 
Beef Measles a 4 5 4 3 4 3 
TB b 4 4 4 3 4 4 
BVD 4 4 2 1 3 2 
BSE 5 5 4 5 4 5 
CBP c 4 4 2 4 3 4 
FMD 2 2 4 4 4 3 
Lice 5 5 2 1 3 4 
MCF d 4 5 4 4 4 4 
Mange e 4.5 5 3 2 4 3 
Salmonellosis 4 4 2.5 2 3 3 
Screwworm f 4.5 5 4 4 4 5 
Toxins g 2.5 3 4 4 4 3 
VS h 3 4 4 3 4 4 
 
SCALE: 
1-very high probability. 
2-high probability. 
3-moderate probability. 
4- low probability. 
5- no probability. 
 
*Median responses from round 3. 
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 a Cysticercus bovis. 
b Mycobacterium bovis. 
c Contagious Bovine Pleuropneumonia-Mycoplasma mycoides mycoides. 
d Malignant Catarrhal Fever. 
e Sarcoptic or Psoroptic. 
f Old or New World. 
g Heavy metals or pesticides. 
h Vesicular Stomatitis.
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Table 2 - Comparison of Managers and Veterinarian Responses* to the Importance 
of Preventative Products, Environmental Control, Disease Transmission Control 
and On-Site Security in Preventing Disease Introduction. 
 
Preventative Products Environmental Control Disease Transmission 
Control 
On-Site Security 
Diseases Managers Veterinarians Managers Veterinarians Managers Veterinarians Managers Veterinarians 
Anthrax 4 4 2 4 2 4 3 3 
Beef Measles a 4 4 2 3 2 5 3 3 
TB b 3 4 2 4 2 3 4 4 
BVD 1 2 2 4 2 2 3 4 
BSE 3 5 2 5 4 5 4 4 
CBP c 2 4 2 4 2 2 3 4 
FMD 2 4 1 3 1 2 1 2 
Lice 2 1 2 4 2 3 4 4 
MCF d 3 4 3 4 2 4 4 4 
Mange e 2 1 2 4 2 2 4 4 
Salmonellosis 3 3 2 2 2 2 3 3 
Screwworm f 3 4 3 4 3 4 4 4 
Toxins g 4 4 2 2 4 5 2 3 
VS h 3 4 2 4 2 3 3 3 
 
SCALE: 
1-very high importance. 
2-high importance. 
3-moderate importance. 
4- low importance. 
5- not important. 
 
*Median responses from round 3. 
a Cysticercus bovis. 
b Mycobacterium bovis. 
c Contagious Bovine Pleuropneumonia-Mycoplasma mycoides mycoides. 
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 d Malignant Catarrhal Fever. 
e Sarcoptic or Psoroptic. 
f Old or New World. 
g Heavy metals or pesticides. 
h Vesicular Stomatitis. 
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Table 3 - Veterinarian Responses* to the Importance of Deterrent Measures in 
Decreasing the Probability of Domestic or International Terrorism in a Feedyard. 
Deterrent Measures Veterinarians
On-Site Security Guard(s) 2 
Maintaining a Perimeter Fence 1 
Locking Perimeter Gates 1 
Video Surveillance 2 
Employee Background Screening 2 
Decreasing Feedyard Visibility a 3 
Decreasing Feedyard Media 
Exposure b
3 
 
SCALE: 
1-very high importance. 
2-high importance. 
3-moderate importance. 
4- low importance. 
5- not important. 
 
*Median responses from round 3. 
a Visibility from highway or road. 
b Internet presence, name recognition associated with marketing. 
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CHAPTER 3 - Biosecurity Practices of Beef Feedyards 
Introduction  
 
Biosecurity is an important aspect of disease prevention in any agricultural 
production system.  Traditional biosecurity at the herd level has played a role in animal 
husbandry since the late nineteenth century eradication of contagious bovine 
pleuropneumonia from the United States.1  Diseases such as bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy and the 2001 outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) in the United 
Kingdom have made biosecurity more important now than ever before.  The global 
marketplace in agricultural trade coupled with increasing international travel has created 
a demand to consider interventions to prevent unintentional foreign animal disease 
introduction.  Furthermore the rise of international terrorist groups with intent to harm the 
US coupled with domestic terrorist groups intent on harming US agriculture have 
increased the potential for an intentional disease introduction to US agriculture.2,3  The 
beef feedyard is particularly vulnerable to disease introduction because of the large 
numbers of cattle arriving from multiple sources making practical biosecurity 
challenging.  For the purposes of this paper, the term biosecurity refers to reducing risk 
associated with the entry of pathologic agents to a particular feedyard by the 
implementation of mitigation strategies.     
Biocontainment is related to biosecurity.  Biocontainment is achieved by 
implementing strategies to reduce risk associated with the transmission of pathologic 
agents between animals already within a feedyard.  The large number of animals and the 
relatively high population density in a modern feedyard make biocontainment an 
important issue.  Disease within the feedyard is inevitable, but can be managed with 
strategies such as segregation of sick animals from the healthy animals or cleaning and 
disinfection of equipment and facilities to decrease exposure of naïve cattle.  These 
principles apply to many diseases endemic to the United States feedyard industry.   
 55
 The large concentration of animals makes a feedyard an inviting bioterrorism 
target for domestic or international terror groups, highlighting the need for good feedyard 
security.  Security practices in the feedyard are aimed at controlling access to the facility 
in an effort to protect everything within it from theft, damage, or contamination.  
Although there have been no reports of intentional disease introductions reported in the 
US, toxins have been intentionally introduced to feedstuffs fed to food animals in the 
United States. These intentional introductions have resulted in cattle deaths as well as 
losses from extended withdrawal times.4  Contamination of animal feed with chemical or 
biologic agents is a current threat of extremist groups and activists.5,6  While objective 
data describing  real versus perceived risk of intentional disease introduction is difficult 
to obtain, data describing biocontainment, biosecurity and security in feedyards is 
feasible to obtain.  Economic losses resulting from introduction of a contagious foreign 
animal disease to a feedyard would be substantial, but biosecurity and security plans for 
each individual feedyard must be economically justifiable.7   Feedyards in the high plains 
were surveyed regarding biocontainment, biosecurity and security to characterize current 
standard practices and assess their impact on the potential biological and economic risks 
faced by the feedyard industry.     
 
Materials and Methods  
   
Survey data were collected from feedyard managers during a personal interview.  
Managers were asked to respond to questions and answers were collected into an 
electronic database.  Approval was obtained by the Kansas State University Institutional 
Review Board Committee for Research Involving Human Subjects.  The database and 
questions were tested using the draft version of the program by visiting with six Kansas 
feedyard managers.  Following revision, the survey was administered in person to 
feedyard management personnel from feedyards in several central plains states. 
Feedyards were sampled from a list of active, confined animal feeding operation 
(CAFO) permits obtained from Kansas, Nebraska, Colorado, Texas and Oklahoma. Only 
feedyards with the capacity to feed more than 1,000 head of cattle and that finished cattle 
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 for slaughter were included in the study.  Feedyard sampling was stratified by one-time 
capacity categories as defined by the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS). 
The strata were 1,000-4,000 head, 4,000-16,000 head, 16,000-32,000 head, and >32,000 
head.  Sample size was calculated to allow estimation of the prevalence of management 
practices within feedlot one-time capacity categories with a 90% confidence interval (+/- 
15%) for practices with a prevalence of approximately 25%.  In Kansas, contact was 
attempted with all feedyards holding a CAFO permit for more than 1,000 head.   Non-
Kansas feedyards were selected for contact based on geographical location in the 
panhandles of Oklahoma and Texas, northeastern Colorado, and throughout Nebraska in 
geographic locales to facilitate travel and collection of data.  Up to four phone calls were 
attempted per feedyard in an effort to contact management personnel about participating 
in the survey.   
For feedyards that agreed to participate, visits were scheduled by a second phone 
call and a meeting time was arranged with a member of feedyard management.  The 
consulting veterinarian for the feedyard was notified of the survey in advance.  Feedyards 
were called and visits were scheduled for each size category until the required number of 
feedyards for that category was filled.  Questions regarding the facility design, security, 
employees, disease preparedness, feedstuffs, hospital/treatment systems, sanitation, cattle 
source, handling of sick cattle, and disposal of carcasses were included in the survey. 
All data were summarized to provide the frequencies of responses to individual 
questions.  Fisher’s exact test was used to assess relationships between cross-classified 
question responses.  P-values < 0.05 were regarded as significant.  Odds ratios with 95% 
confidence intervals were calculated where applicable.   
 
Results  
Feedyards 
 
Table 4 illustrates the results of efforts to contact feedyard management for 
completion of the survey. The survey was performed in 106 feedyards.  Of feedyards that 
were contacted and met the inclusion criteria 72% (159/221) agreed to participate and 
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 67% (106/159) of these were surveyed.  The frequency distribution of feedyards surveyed 
in each of the four NASS categories were:  1,000-4,000 head (29), 4,000-16,000 head 
(32), 16,000-32,000 head (25), and >32,000 head (20).  One-time capacity in feedyards in 
this survey ranged from 1300 to 125,000 head.  Surveys were answered by owners (19), 
managers (85), and assistant managers (2). 
Descriptive responses to areas of biocontainment, biosecurity and security are 
reported in tables 5, 6 and 7 respectively.  In this survey, 44.3% of feedyards cleaned oral 
treatment equipment weekly or less often, 69.3% cleaned the unloading facility monthly 
or less often, and 24.5% cleaned the treatment facility monthly or less often.  Feedyards 
that unloaded cattle into a multi-purpose facility used for both treatment and unloading 
did not clean the facility more often than those that used a separate unloading facility 
(P=.35).  
The majority of feedyards import cattle directly from the auction market.  
Feedyard size had no association with the likelihood of importing more than 51% auction 
market cattle (P=0.90).  Thirty-four percent of feedyards reported importing >25% 
backgrounded cattle directly into the feedyard.  The dead stock were located outside of 
the normal feedyard traffic pattern in 71.7% of feedyards.   
Forty-seven percent of the feedyards in the survey did not lock cattle behind gates 
or employ a night watchman.  Only 26.4% of feedyards performed both a criminal 
background check and checked on resume references given by new employees. 
 
Discussion 
 
The purpose of this survey was to assess the current practices of feedyards in 
biocontainment, biosecurity and security.  The states included in the survey represent 5 of 
the top 7 beef producing states in the nation.  These states feed 77% (9,230,000 head) of 
the total cattle fed in US feedyards with a one-time capacity of 1,000 head or more as of 
January 1, 2007.8  
 
Biocontainment 
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The feedyard is a population dense environment with numerous opportunities for 
disease transmission.  Biocontainment practices should be implemented to reduce disease 
transmission.  Segregation of diseased cattle to avoid direct exposure of healthy cattle is 
the basis of transmission control for endemic agents.9,10  Despite this a substantial number 
of feedyards surveyed (36.8%) allowed fence-line contact between sick cattle in the 
hospital system and healthy cattle.     
One quarter of feedyards use the same equipment to handle both manure and dead 
stock and feedstuffs (Table 5).  This practice is most common among the smallest 
feedyards. Among those yards that handle manure, dead stock and feed with the same 
equipment, only 15% clean and disinfect that equipment prior to handling feed.  Dead 
animals can continue to threaten healthy cattle if equipment is used for handling 
carcasses and subsequent feed handling.  This risk is highest if feedyards do not 
thoroughly clean and disinfect the equipment before using it for feedstuffs.  Transmission 
and persistence of agents such as Salmonella, E. coli O157 and bovine viral diarrhea 
virus (BVDV) may be facilitated by this practice.  Esherichia coli O157 can survive for 
days in manure depending on the storage temperature.11 Salmonella dublin has been 
found in dried manure after 5 years and in an empty slurry pit after 4 years.12  Ideally 
feed equipment should be only used for handling feed.  Proper cleaning and disinfection 
or the use of changeable loader buckets is the best protocol for feedyards where the feed 
equipment must be used for handling carcasses or manure.     
Most feedyards in this survey piled the dead stock outside of the normal feedyard 
traffic pattern.  They may have perceived the carcasses were a potential source for 
pathogen transmission to other healthy animals.  Dead stock should be placed outside the 
normal feedyard traffic pattern to reduce potential transmission within the feedyard and 
keep the rendering truck and impending pathogens outside the facility.    
Another potential vehicle of transmission is oral treatment equipment.  Small 
feedyards were less likely to clean oral treatment equipment than were larger yards.  
Enteric agents such as Salmonella or BVDV are shed in saliva and may be transmitted 
iatrogenically between calves when proper sanitation is not practiced.  Less than half of 
the feedyards in this survey cleaned oral treatment equipment after each animal and 
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 roughly one quarter disinfected such equipment between animals.  Feedyards that clean 
and disinfect the oral equipment daily or less often are unlikely to reduce the risk of 
disease transmission.   
Effective cleaning and disinfection strategies can decrease risk of indirect 
transmission within the treatment facilities as well, especially if the facilities are also 
being used to unload healthy incoming cattle.  Feedyards were not more likely to clean 
and disinfect their facilities if they were used for both treatment and unloading compared 
to feedyards that used separate facilities for each.  Studies have suggested that transport 
increases the fecal shedding of agents such as E. coli O157 and Salmonella therefore an 
accumulation of agents can occur in the unloading facility if it is not cleaned 
regularly.11,13  The majority of feedyards are cleaning the unloading facility monthly or 
less often, while fewer than one-fourth reported cleaning the treatment facility at the 
same frequency.  Cleaning facilities infrequently may not decrease the risk of 
transmission when compared to the feedyards that do nothing.  Data regarding the risk of 
disease transmission in the unloading facility and the effectiveness of cleaning and 
disinfecting strategies are not available.  However, it seems likely dirty facilities would 
increase the risk for incoming cattle and cattle that are being treated in the in the same 
multi-purpose facility. 
Small feedyards were less likely that large feedyards to employ biocontainment 
practices in this survey. Smaller feedyards may be more likely to use a multi-purpose 
facility for both treatment and unloading newly-received cattle compared to larger 
feedyards because they have fewer cattle to treat.  The lower number treated may result in 
a perception of lower pathogen exposure of new arriving cattle as compared to larger 
feedyards.  Alternately they may not be able to justify the capital investment necessary to 
build separate facilities for unloading and treatment.  While fewer cattle are treated in 
smaller feedyards, the pathogens shed by morbid animals will not differ greatly between 
feedyards.    Risk of feed contamination from carcasses or manure is related more to the 
amount of gross contamination of the feed which is likely increased by using the same 
equipment for handling manure and dead stock and feed.  Small feedyards were more 
likely to use feed loaders to handle dead stock or manure than were larger yards.  Smaller 
feedyards may face financial constraints that prevent complete dedication of equipment 
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 solely for feedstuffs.  In order to decrease risk of transmission, the smaller feedyards 
should clean and disinfect the equipment after it has been used to haul potential 
contaminants but these data suggest they generally do not. 
Biosecurity 
 
Traditional biosecurity in the sense of preventing introduction of disease onto a 
feedyard is difficult at best and in many cases impractical.  By the nature of the industry, 
feedyards accept risks by purchasing a large number of cattle from multiple sources.  In 
many cases these cattle may have been purchased at an auction market where they have 
been commingled with other cattle prior to transport to the feedyard.  In addition, 
feedyards may import from multiple different auction markets on a continuous basis.  
Many of the diseases of importance to the feedyard industry are also relatively ubiquitous 
within the cattle population and shedding may increase during transport for agents like E. 
coli 0157:H713 and Salmonella.12  The agents associated with Bovine Respiratory Disease 
Complex for example are present in all cattle populations and efforts to exclude them are 
fruitless.  This large and continuous influx of cattle and the endemic nature of many 
diseases of importance to feedyards makes it challenging and often impractical to control 
disease introduction.  However, the feedyards importing cattle directly from a 
backgrounder facility may face fewer disease outbreaks and will require fewer resources 
to be devoted to treatment.  One study showed preconditioning cattle and minimizing 
transport to the feedyard decreases fecal shedding of E. coli 0157:H7 and Salmonella.13   
The feedyard cannot control exposure to pathogens at the auction market but may 
be able to control transportation practices.  While a relatively uncommon practice, 
requiring trailers to be cleaned and when possible disinfected before incoming cattle are 
loaded for shipment to the feedyard may help control exposure to pathogens such as E. 
coli 0157:H7, Salmonella or BVDV.14  Other food animal industries have already 
accepted standards of cleanliness for prevention of disease introduction into a facility.  
Research has shown that cleaning and disinfecting livestock trailers can prevent indirect 
infection for porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome in swine.15  Feedyard 
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 managers may consider requiring trucking companies to comply with these requirements 
to decrease the risk of transmission from previously shipped loads.    
Rational biosecurity on a feedyard may include practices to prevent feed 
contamination with agents of enteric disease such as Salmonella or Eimeria from off-site 
sources.  Keeping employees and visitors from stepping in the bunks, or walking or 
driving through feed storage areas may decrease risk.  Visiting vehicles should not be 
allowed to contact feed storage areas such as silage pits or commodity storage areas.   
Fomites such as shoes and clothing worn by humans may serve to transmit foot-
and-mouth disease virus (FMDV) and other diseases and thus pose a threat to feedyard 
cattle.  Feedyard personnel should screen visitors for previous animal contact, especially 
if visiting or returning from a foreign country where FMDV is present, or if FMDV is 
introduced into this country.  A recent survey of feedyard managers and consulting 
veterinarians indicates they believe FMDV to be the most likely pathogenic agent to be 
introduced by bioterrorism.16   
Wearing clean boots or shoes around the feedstuffs is important to decrease the 
risk of fecal-oral contamination, yet feedyards in this survey rarely required visitors to 
wear clean boots or shoes.  Wearing clothing and shoes that have not been contaminated 
by exposure to other animals or animal waste is a standard of practice in swine 
confinement systems.  Some studies have shown that wearing clean outerwear may even 
prevent transmission of FMDV in swine.17  The authors are unaware of investigations of 
footwear transmission of disease in the feedyard industry, but one study in the swine 
industry suggests that plastic booties over the top of personal footwear may decrease 
transmission of some viral agents.18    
Feedyard size did not affect the likelihood of utilizing any of the biosecurity 
practices mentioned above except requiring cleaning of trailers prior to loading incoming 
cattle.  Smaller feedyards may have more control over this activity because they work 
more directly with the trucking companies.  Biosecurity mitigation strategies could be 
improved in most of the feedyards included in this survey.  Veterinarians will be needed 
to address biosecurity standards and to explain the importance of proactive biosecurity 
plans.  Should FMDV enter the US, individual feedyard risk will be higher and justify 
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 more careful implementation of biosecurity measures.  It would be preferable if those 
measures were ready for implementation should a FMDV outbreak occur. 
 
Security 
 
Security plays an important role in feedyards particularly because in most 
operations the cattle and some feedstuffs are kept outdoors.  Several incidents involving 
cattle in the U.S. and other countries have been characterized by feed contamination and 
intoxication.5,19,20  History suggests cattle producers should consider the risk of feed 
contamination and methods of risk reduction.  A perimeter fence with restricted access 
entrance gates allows the feedyard management to limit access to only authorized 
personnel.  This will limit access to the mill where micronutrients and protein 
supplements could be contaminated and then fed unknowingly to the cattle as well as the 
feed bunks should a perpetrator desire to contaminate feed already fed to the cattle.  Less 
than half of the feedyards reported having a fence that will stop humans.  Deterrence of 
unauthorized entry may reduce the risk of intentional disease or toxicant introduction by 
increasing the difficulty of gaining access to critical areas.  Although a determined 
terrorist may still gain access through a well built fence, the terrorist may be inclined to 
target a facility with less security measures and easier access.  Objective data on real 
versus perceived risk is difficult to obtain for intentional disease introduction risks.  
Domestic terrorist groups have targeted animal-related facilities but the authors are 
unaware of a known attack on a feedyard.  People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals 
(PETA) have made statements indicating they would welcome the introduction of FMDV 
to the United States.6   
In the USDA Feedlot 99 survey21 86.3% of feedyards reported storing protein 
supplements and 37.3% reported storing mineral supplements in sealed containers (silos, 
tanks, bins, drums) and the remainder of feedyards in the survey that utilized protein and 
mineral supplements stored them in covered piles, bunks, pits, or sheds.  Piles, bunks, and 
pits are easily accessible in most feedyards.  Locking the sources of the supplements 
within a container or behind a fence may deter malicious intentional feed contamination.   
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 Security is especially important at night, yet over half of feedyards are not 
keeping cattle locked up and two thirds are not utilizing a night watchman.  In some 
cases, managers or other employees live on or near the facility which may serve to deter 
unauthorized entry.  A personal encounter with feedyard personnel may be even more 
effective than the best of locks.  Signage directing traffic and visitors to the office 
communicates the importance of biosecurity and security to visitors and gives feedyard 
staff an opportunity to discuss the purpose of the visit.  In addition to asking visitors to 
sign their name, visitors should be questioned about previous animal exposure which may 
increase the risk of accidental disease introduction through contaminated clothes or boots.  
Asking visitors to sign out as they leave also conveys the perception of surveillance by 
feedyard employees to visitors within the facility.  Controlling both direct and indirect 
animal contact with visitors will be much more important if a contagious disease like 
FMDV is introduced to the country.  Additionally, identifying visitors that have checked 
in through the office and training feedyard personnel to challenge all visitors not so 
identified may be useful in deterring malicious acts.  Terrorist organizations, both 
domestic and international, commonly probe defenses of prospective targets to identify 
security weaknesses.  Disgruntled employees or neighbors may also be aware of 
weaknesses.  A well implemented security policy, while not invulnerable, may make the 
feedyard a less inviting target.    
Most feedyards are active in learning about an employee’s history prior to hiring.  
Checking references and visiting with a previous employer may provide information 
regarding experience and beliefs about production agriculture.  A criminal background 
check may reveal illegal actions taken against other animal facilities in the past.  
Feedyards in this survey may not have pursued knowledge about potential future 
employees by both methods because in some cases the new employees are well-known 
long-time members of the local agricultural community.  In instances where the applicant 
is not known by the feedyard personnel a more thorough check of references and 
background may be prudent to assess whether potential employees can be trusted to work 
in vulnerable areas of the feedyard. 
The NAHMS Feedlot 9921 study showed that 25.6% of feedyards >8,000 head 
restricted people (for example, deny access or require clean clothing) compared to 15.5% 
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 of feedyards 1,000-7,999 head.  A similar trend occurs among the security questions of 
our survey that shows larger feedyards were more likely to have implemented strategies 
to reduce unauthorized visitors from accessing cattle and feed.  The larger feedyards have 
more money invested in the livestock operation and they may feel security measures are 
justified to decrease the risk to their assets.  Larger feedyards also have more staff to 
support the monitoring of feedyard traffic both during the day and at night.  By 
monitoring the activity of visitors, the feedyard staff can limit exposure to the cattle and 
feedstuffs which may prevent unintentional, or deter intentional disease introduction or 
feedstuff contamination.  It also portrays to personnel on the facility the importance of 
security measures and the value of the commodities and cattle within.  
This survey has revealed benchmark practices for biocontainment, biosecurity and 
security in central plains state feedyards.  Benchmarks are commonly used in the 
feedyard industry for comparison of a feedyard to the larger population of feedyards in 
the industry.22   Information gained from the survey results can be used by consulting 
veterinarians and feedyard managers for discussion and to target training efforts.  While 
the feedyards included here are not a random sample of all yards in the states represented 
they do capture a large portion of the central plains states where the majority of the cattle 
in the US are fed as well as a wide range of feedyard sizes.   Of feedyards that we were 
able to contact and that met the inclusion criteria we had a high acceptance rate and 
subsequently were able to survey most of those.  While this may have left opportunity for 
some bias in the estimates of practices, we believe that the data provide valuable insight 
into the practices of feedyards in the central plains and surrounding areas.    
Production animal agriculture has advanced in the development of practices that 
decrease the risks of biosecurity and biocontainment.  The swine and poultry23 industries 
have tailored production systems around these practices.  Biosecurity and biocontainment 
in the feedyard industry however is more challenging in many ways.  While the swine 
and poultry industries are able to operate in an indoor controlled environment and 
practice all-in, all-out management, the feedyard industry operates in an open 
environment with continual flow of cattle.  Careful assessment and implementation of 
key principles may however be effective in controlling risk from disease or toxin 
introduction by either accidental or intentional means.  
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 Feedyards included in this survey may not implement more of these 
biocontainment, biosecurity, and security practices for several reasons.  They may be 
unaware of the risks or the appropriate mitigation strategies to decrease risk.  
Veterinarians should help managers to better understand the routes of transmission for the 
diseases that are most threatening to their operation and develop optimal plans aimed at 
preventing disease transmission.  In contrast, managers may understand the risks but 
perceive the mitigation strategies to be ineffective or uneconomical.  Information about 
disease risks and mitigation strategies should be used with cost-benefit analyses by 
veterinarians and managers to establish best management practices for each feedyard.  
Action plans for disease outbreaks developed with veterinary consultation would be 
valuable to managers to educate feedyard employees and plan for an effective response.  
Additional research will be helpful to better understand the real risks and to determine 
which mitigation strategies provide the most economic benefits.  Veterinarians are pivotal 
in educating the feedyard staff about the dynamic risk of disease introduction into and 
transmission within the feedyard which characterizes the industry. 
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 Table 4 - Efforts to contact feedyard management about participation in the survey 
State Attempted Contact 
Unable to 
Contact Consented Refused 
Did not 
meet 
inclusion 
criteria 
Visited 
Kansas 308 124 110 33 41 72 
Nebraska 46 8 17 19 2 12 
Colorado 39 15 17 5 2 12 
Texas 40 28 10 2 0 7 
Oklahoma 14 6 5 3 0 3 
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 Table 5 - Responses to questions related to Biocontainment within the feedyard 
Number of affirmative responses  One-time capacity (head) 
Question (number of responses) 
 
All 1,000-4000 
4,000-
16,000 
16,000-
32,000 >32,000 
Is the oral treatment equipment cleaned 
ever?* (106) 
98 
(92.5%) 
23 
(79.3%) 
31 
(96.9%) 
25 
(100.0%) 
19 
(95.0%) 
Is the oral treatment equipment cleaned 
after each animal? (106) 
48 
(45.3%) 
10 
(34.5%) 
15 
(46.9%) 
13 
(52.0%) 
10 
(50.0%) 
Is the oral treatment equipment disinfected 
ever?* (106) 
68 
(64.2%) 
13   
(44.8%) 
18  
(56.3%) 
22 
(88.0%) 
15 
(75.0%) 
Is the oral treatment equipment cleaned 
and disinfected after each animal? (106) 
28 
(26.4%) 
2 
(6.9%) 
7 
(21.9%) 
11  
(44.0%) 
8    
(40.0%) 
Is the processing facility cleaned daily?* 
(106) 
51  
(48.1%) 
3    
(10.3%) 
12  
(37.5%) 
18  
(72.0%) 
18  
(90.0%) 
Is the processing facility cleaned and 
disinfected daily? (106) 
11   
(10.4%) 0 
3      
(9.4%) 
5    
(20.0%) 
3    
(15.0%) 
Is the treatment facility cleaned daily?* 
(106) 
43  
(40.6%) 
2      
(6.9%) 
10  
(31.3%) 
16  
(64.0%) 
15  
(75.0%) 
Is the treatment facility cleaned and 
disinfected daily?  (106) 
12  
(11.3%) 0 
3 
(9.4%) 
6 
(24.0%) 
3    
(15.0%) 
Are cattle treated and separated in hospital 
pens? (106) 
95  
(89.6%) 
24  
(82.8%) 
28 
(87.5%) 
25 
(100.0%) 
18  
(90.0%) 
Do sick cattle in hospital pens have fence-
line contact with healthy cattle? (95) 
35   
(36.8%) 
7    
(29.2%) 
11  
(39.3%) 
9 
(36.0%) 
8    
(44.4%) 
Is the loading/unloading facility cleaned 
weekly or more often?(106) 
31   
(29.2%) 
7    
(24.1%) 
11  
(10.4%) 
5    
(20.0%) 
8    
(40.0%) 
Is the loading/unloading facility cleaned 
and disinfected weekly or more often? 
(106) 
2      
(1.9%) 
1      
(3.4%) 
1      
(3.4%) 0 
1      
(3.4%) 
Are cattle unloaded in the same facility 
used to treat sick cattle?* (106) 
38  
(35.9%) 
22  
(75.9%) 
13  
(40.6%) 
1 
(4.0%) 
2    
(10.0%) 
Is the facility used for both treatment and 
unloading disinfected weekly or more 
often?  (38) 
1 
(2.6%) 
1      
(4.5%) 0 0 0 
Are feedyard loaders and trucks used to 
handle dead stock and manure ever used 
for feed handling?* (106) 
27  
(25.5%) 
13  
(44.8%) 
9    
(28.1%) 
3 
(12.0%) 
2    
(10.0%) 
Is equipment always thoroughly cleaned 
and disinfected after handling dead stock 
or manure before handling feed? (27) 
4 
(14.8%) 
2    
(15.4%) 
1 
(11.1%) 0 
1     
(50.0%) 
 
*Significant (P<.05) differences between feedyard size  
All 106 feedyards responded to the survey.  Questions with less than 106 responses are 
due to dependence on the response to a previous question in the survey tool.   
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 Table 6 - Responses to questions related to Biosecurity in the feedyard 
Number of affirmative responses   One-time capacity (head) 
Question (number of responses) All 1,000-4000 
4,000-
16,000 
16,000-
32,000 >32,000 
Is history of animal contact collected from 
visitors/vendors?  (106) 
3     
(2.8%) 0 
1   
(3.1%) 0 
2 
(10.0%) 
Is history of international travel collected 
from visitors/vendors?* (106) 
5   
(4.7%) 0 
1   
(3.1%) 0 
4 
(20.0%) 
Are visitors required to use feedyard vehicles 
when on the facility? (106) 
42 
(39.6%) 
13 
(44.8%) 
12 
(37.5%) 
10 
(40.0%) 
7 
(35.0%) 
Are clean boots or foot coverings required for 
visitors? (106) 
2   
(1.9%) 0 
1   
(3.1%) 0 
1   
(5.0%) 
Are all cattle with unknown BVDV status ear 
notched and tested so persistently infected 
(PI) animals can be removed from the 
feedyard. (106) 
3   
(2.8%) 0 
1   
(3.1%) 
1   
(4.0%) 
1   
(5.0%) 
Are new arrivals separated from other cattle 
until BVDV PI status is known? (3) 
2 
(66.7%) - 0 
1 
(100.0%) 
1 
(100.0%) 
Are trailers required to be cleaned before 
loading incoming cattle?* (106)  
15 
(14.2%) 
8 
(27.6%) 
5 
(15.6%) 0 
2 
(10.0%) 
Are more than 51% of cattle arriving from 
the auction market?  (106) 
61 
(57.6%) 
18 
(62.1%) 
18 
(56.3%) 
13 
(52.0%) 
12 
(60.0%) 
Are carcasses disposed of by a rendering 
service? (106) 
92 
(86.8%) 
23 
(79.3%) 
27 
(84.4%) 
23 
(92.0%) 
19 
(95.0%) 
Does the rendering truck drive across the 
normal feedyard traffic pattern to access the 
dead pile? (92) 
75 
(81.5%) 
17 
(73.9%) 
24 
(88.9%) 
19 
(82.6%) 
15 
(78.9%) 
 
*Significant (P<.05) differences between feedyard size  
All 106 feedyards responded to the survey.  Questions with less than 106 responses are 
due to dependence on the response to a previous question in the survey tool. 
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 Table 7 - Responses to questions related to Security in the feedyard 
Number of affirmative responses   One-time capacity (head) 
Question (number of responses) All 1,000-4000 
4,000-
16,000 
16,000-
32,000 >32,000 
Does the feedyard have a perimeter fence?* 
(106)  
67 
(63.2%) 
8 
(27.6%) 
20 
(62.5%) 
20 
(80.0%) 
19 
(95.0%) 
Will the perimeter fence stop vehicles?* (67) 45 (67.2%) 
2 
(25.0%) 
14 
(70.0%) 
14 
(70.0%) 
15 
(78.9%) 
Will the perimeter fence stop humans?* (67) 10 (14.9%) 0 
2 
(10.0%) 
3 
(15.0%) 
5 
(26.3%) 
Are all cattle behind locked gates?* (106) 43 (40.6%) 
5 
(17.2%) 
9 
(28.1%) 
13 
(52.0%) 
16 
(80.0%) 
Is there signage directing visitors to check in 
at the office?*  (106) 
44 
(41.5%) 0 
9 
(28.1%) 
17 
(68.0%) 
18 
(90.0%) 
Is a visitor log maintained and enforced?* 
(106) 
25 
(23.6%) 0 
3   
(9.4%) 
7 
(28.0%) 
15 
(75.0%) 
Is a night watchman employed?* (106) 35 (33.0%) 0 
7 
(21.9%) 
12 
(48.0%) 
16 
(80.0%) 
Are employee resume references checked at 
hiring?* (106) 
80 
(75.5%) 
18 
(44.8%) 
28 
(87.5%) 
24 
(96.0%) 
15 
(75.0%) 
Is a criminal background check performed at 
hiring?* (106) 
28 
(26.4%) 
3 
(10.3%) 
8 
(25.0%) 
12 
(48.0%) 
5 
(25.0%) 
Are all micro-nutrients secured from 
unauthorized access?* (106) 
47 
(44.3%) 
7 
(24.1%) 
10 
(31.3%) 
18 
(72.0%) 
12 
(60.0%) 
Are all protein supplements secured from 
unauthorized access? (106) 
44 
(41.5%) 
10 
(34.5%) 
10 
(31.3%) 
15 
(60.0%) 
9 
(45.0%) 
 
*Significant (P<.05) differences between feedyard size 
All 106 feedyards responded to the survey.  Questions with less than 106 responses are 
due to dependence on the response to a previous question in the survey tool. 
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